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Abstract 
The paper focuses on a scantly researched phenomenon, namely, the extent to which financial inclusion 
is influenced by corporate governance practices. The question that normally arises is whether corporate 
governance practices are tailored to supporting the financial inclusion mandate. The other question is 
whether there are certain corporate governance practices that advance financial inclusion. This paper 
reviews extant empirical literature on these matters with a view of stimulating debate on the subject. 
Cognisant that institutions that advance financial inclusion are largely financial institutions, the starting 
point is relating to contemporary corporate governance practice in financial institutions. We know that 
financial institutions belong to a specific class of corporations whose failure affects society at large 
because of the financial services they provide. As a result, they are heavily regulated and their corporate 
governance structures are bound to differ from those of conventional firms. Similarly, we know that 
financial inclusion institutions are special types of financial institutions with mandates to provide financial 
services to underserved population segments which equally require special treatment. The scant 
literature available shows, albeit not conclusive, some evidence of a positive relationship between 
sound corporate governance and financial inclusion. However, more research on how corporate 
governance affects different dimensions of financial inclusion is recommended. 
Keywords: Corporate governance; Financial inclusion; Microfinance institutions; Bottom of the 
economic pyramid; Board accountability 
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The World Bank* defines financial inclusion as “individuals and businesses having access to useful and 
affordable financial products and services that meet their needs -transactions, payments, savings, credit and 
insurance -delivered in a responsible and sustainable way”, which definition captures some elements of good 
corporate governance. Good corporate governance ensures that financial services are “delivered in a 
responsible and sustainable way”. However, little is known on how corporate governance is practised and 
the factors influencing it in special institutions with mandates of advancing financial inclusion. Financial 
inclusion institutions, which include, among others, microfinance institutions (MFIs)/banks, postal banks, 
savings banks, credit associations and cooperatives are special type of financial institutions with specific 
mandates to provide financial services to underserved segments of the population. Although these 
institutions play a critical role in advancing financial inclusion to people at the bottom of the pyramid (BOP), 
lack of adequate regulations and proper governance tend to misalign the core focus of these institutions 
(Ambarkhane, Singh, & Venkataramani, 2016).  
 
The way corporate governance is practiced in financial institutions has since been observed to differ from 
the manner it is practiced in non-financial firms. For instance, Hopt (2013) has observed that the scope of 
corporate governance of financial institutions goes beyond equity governance (focus on shareholders) to 
embrace other stakeholders such as debt holders, insurance policy holders, other creditors and regulators. 
Such a stakeholder approach is considered appropriate because risk taking by financial institutions, banks 
in particular, may require government support if they become distressed (Anginer et al., 2015). Therefore, 
risk taking, and corporate governance approach may be different in the case of banks. The definition of 
corporate governance of banks provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (2006) recognizes 
the plurality of stakeholders involved. It defines it as “the methods and approaches used to manage banks 
through the board of directors and senior management which determine how to put the bank's objectives, 
operation and protect the interests of shareholders and stakeholders with a commitment to act in accordance 
with existing laws and regulations and to achieve the protection of the interests of depositors”.  
 
The intellectual debate has been whether corporate governance should only focus on protecting the interests 
of shareholders or that it should also embrace other stakeholders who are non-shareholders (Macey & 
O’Hara, 2003). The Anglo-American model of corporate governance focuses on the primary objective of 
maximizing shareholder value, and in the absence of a legal duty, other interests are ignored to the extent 
they conflict with the primary objective. Conversely, the Franco-German model views corporations as 
“industrial partnerships” in which the interests of long-term stakeholders are given the same respect as 
shareholders (Ziegler, 2000).  
 
Why should corporate governance of financial institutions get special treatment? The flow of funds in the 
economy is facilitated by the financial system. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 is testimony of what can 
go wrong when there is a disruption in the flow of funds. Financial institutions are more likely to allocate 
capital efficiently and exert effective corporate governance over firms they lend to if they have sound 
corporate governance themselves.  However, we know that banks are generally more opaque than non-
financial firms are. They can hide loan quality and easily alter the risk composition of their assets to continue 
lending to risky clients. This is one reason they are more regulated than other sectors of the economy. The 
global financial crisis has shown that while shareholders enjoy limited liability, taxpayers face unlimited 
liability in the event of failure of ‘too big to fail’ financial institutions.  
 
Adoption of sound corporate governance is critical for nurturing and sustaining public confidence in banks 
(Zulfikar et al., 2020). However, in a real business environment, there is conflict in the roles of agents and 
shareholders. These parties tend to interfere with each other’s responsibilities leading to information 
asymmetry and agency problems. This problem is pervasive in MFIs because apart from addressing agent 
and principal issue, they are other third-party stakeholders.  
 
The special category of financial institutions with a mandate to facilitate financial inclusion –hereinafter 
referred to as financial inclusion institutions –are not individually too big to pose systemic risks that can 
potentially lead to the failure of the entire financial system. However, their failure nevertheless can still be 
costly to both society and the marginalised low-income segments of the population which they serve. Hence, 
effective corporate governance is equally important to financial inclusion institutions as it is to the mainstream 
 
*https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview 
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financial institutions. Accordingly, this raises three empirical research questions for investigation. First, to 
what extent does corporate governance influence financial inclusion? Second, are there specific corporate 
governance practices that facilitate compliance with the financial inclusion mandate? Third, which corporate 
governance practices are critical in contributing to financial inclusion? The objective of this review paper to 
scan the literature that has attempted to address these questions with a view of stimulating future research. 
The paper is exploratory in nature in that its methodology is a preliminary review of extant literature in 
preparation of a systematic study of the subject matter. 
 
Thus, the rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews literature on the institutional 
environment of financial inclusion institutions. This is followed by a review of theories of corporate 
governance in the context of financial institutions. Then empirical literature on corporate governance 
practices of MFIs is discussed. The concludes by suggesting areas for future research. 
 
Literature Review of the Institutional Environment 
 
Generally, financial inclusion institutions such as MFIs operate in economies at what authors like Prahalad 
(2004) term “the bottom of the economic pyramid (BOP)”. Economies that operate at the BOP have 
populations that live on less than US$1.25 per day (UNDP, 2007). Most of developing countries’ populations 
operate at the BOP, that is they live on less than US$3,000 per year (Jansson & AfSillén, 2013). Most of 
these people live in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America (Prahalad & Hammond, 2002).  
 
BOP economies are relatively unsaturated markets made up of US$5 trillion in purchasing power (Lehikoinen 
et al., 2018), and are consequently interesting markets for companies (Jansson & AfSillén, 2013). According 
to the World Resources Institute (2007), the BOP market is the biggest consumer market in Africa with an 
estimated purchasing power of 71% that translates into a market size of US$429 billion. Firms generally 
hesitate to go into the BOP market because it is complex, unorganized and fragmented (Lehikoinen et al., 
2018). Prahalad (2012) observes that when companies go to these markets, they face an ethical dilemma of 
making profits from customers who can hardly make a living. However, today’s corporate society does not 
care about ethical judgement, they are more concerned with profit maximization without considering who 
they exploit. This contradicts Prahalad’s (2012) stand. Hence, the common hurdles companies that operate 
at the BOP face are changing consumers’ behaviour and rethinking the way products are made and delivered 
(Simanis & Duke, 2014).  
 
BOP economies are generally characterized by “agrarian-orientation, poverty, lack of education and health 
services, gender inequality, lack of hard and soft infrastructure [including financial services], low per capita 
income, and underdeveloped entrepreneurial and business activity” (Varman, Skalen, & Belk, 2012; Cheston 
& Kuhn, 2002; Robinson, 2001). As observed by Mair & Marti (2009), many of these characteristics are 
caused by “institutional voids”, that is, non-existent or poor institutional mechanisms that prevent the effective 
working of systems. Institutional voids stem from the external environment and are beyond the control of 
firms but threaten firms’ organizational viability and prevent them from undertaking efficient exchanges and 
enforcing contracts. These difficulties contribute to increased operating costs of firms operating at the BOP 
(Karamchandani, Kubzansky, & Lalwani, 2011; Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Prahalad & Hart, 2002).  
 
The microfinance industry can be viewed as a response to cure the institutional void besetting the financial 
service soft infrastructure at the BOP. However, in trying to fill the institutional void, MFIs are also hamstrung 
by the numerous institutional voids. It is argued that one mechanism to work around these voids is through 
effective corporate governance. Mersland (2007: 10) defines “corporate governance of a firm operating at 
the BOP as the system or set of mechanisms that internally direct and control the firm in the present social 
and economic context”. MFIs are a development tool for fighting poverty in developing countries whose 
economies are at the BOP characterized by institutional voids that include, among others: lack of 
accountability, ineffective enforcement of contracts, weak and compromised judiciary, lack of property rights, 
corruption, lack of independent media, incompetence in bureaucracy, and poor provision of financial services 
(Khanna et al. 2005; Mair & Marti 2006). More so, indigenous structures like savings groups have also failed 
to mastermind developments at BOP; even when they are properly run, members are financially constrained. 
Thus, the financial system of an economy at the BOP is underdeveloped so that poor people cannot access 
financial services. Financial cooperatives and NGOs appear to be the only way forward for people at the 
BOP, but since they are not shareholder-owned firms, they do not have solid governance structures. 
Consequently, it has been argued that NGOS and cooperatives should transform into shareholder-owned 
firms to improve the governance of these organisations (D’ espalier et al., 2017).  
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Chakrabarty and Bass (2014) utilize the sociological approach in institutional theory to hypothesize that 
corporate boards should consider challenges posed by institutional voids when guiding their respective firms. 
Focusing on MFIs, they hypothesize that a board, which appreciate and understand BOP socio-economic 
issues are in a better position to guide their firms. MFIs are seen to fill a specific institutional void such as 
lack of access to financial services by poor people. MFIs are observed to face institutional voids in political 
and social systems, in labour markets and in product markets of impoverished agrarian regions that they 
have to work around. On the other hand, it can be argued that financial cooperatives are better placed to 
deal with these institutional voids since they are grass-root and understand the socio-economic structure of 
people they serve at the BOP. However, cooperatives are plagued by conflict of interest between members 
who use them as saving vehicles and those who use them as loan vehicles; for instance, savers would prefer 
to have a high interest rate on loans while borrowers would prefer a lower interest rate (Djan & Mersland, 
2021). This conflict of interest undermines existing governance structures leading to the objective of serving 
the financially underserved not being met.  
 
From the foregoing, it is imperative that the corporate governance of MFIs and similar financial inclusion 
institutions should consider, among other factors, the institutional environment under which they operate. 
However, a preliminary scan of literature shows that finding empirical evidence that supports the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial inclusion may not be that easy. Afi (2010: 75) provides three 
main reasons for the difficulty. First, to estimate corporate governance requires its definition, setting a 
standard and computing the deviations, which exercise is fraught with problems. Second, the measurement 
of financial inclusion has many dimensions so that any analysis of its relationship with corporate governance 
will depend on a particular measure used. Third, identifying all relevant variables necessary to deduce a 
connection is complex. These problems present both opportunities and challenges for future research on the 
subject matter. 
 
Theories of Corporate Governance 
 
Several competing theories underpin corporate governance. Some are more relevant to explaining corporate 




Amongst the different theories, agency theory is considered the standard theory of corporate governance 
which at its simplest form views actors in a firm in terms of a principal-agent relationship, that is, shareholders 
as principals and managers as agents (Daily, Dalton, & Canella, 2003). It provides guidance in the 
conceptualising of corporate governance and provides alignment of the interests of managers and 
shareholders. Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama & Jensen (1983a; 1983b) have argued that the 
separation of ownership from control creates agency problems whereby agents may not bear the risks or the 
“wealth effects of their decisions”. Managers are inclined to shirk their fiduciary duty of maximizing 
shareholder wealth.  
 
Coase (1937) pioneered the foundational work on markets and firms. The firm implied envisaged in the 
standard agency theory is the Coasian firm that assumes perfect competition, and optimal capital structure. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) complemented the Coasian framework by incorporating information asymmetry 
whereby though shareholders have expectations of managers acting in their best interests, they may not 
voluntarily do so. This creates information asymmetry in an organisation, leading to an agency problem.  
They suggest that this problem can be resolved through prescriptive contracts that mitigate information 
asymmetry between the agent (managers) and the principal (shareholders) in the firm which idea is 
supported by other scholars such Ssekiziyivu et al. (2018). While in theory contracting can eliminate the 
agency problem, in practice this may not be possible due to information asymmetry, rationality, fraud and 
transaction costs (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). 
 
Focusing on the banking sector, Hagendorff, Collins, & Keasey (2007) have argued that it requires a different 
agency analysis because of unique agency relationships stemming from the managers’ duty to safeguard 
the funds from various capital providers including depositors. Hence, we can expect practices of corporate 
governance in banks to exhibit marked differences with practices in conventional corporations. The Coasian 
firm assumes perfect competition, optimal capital structure and where information asymmetry arises from the 
principal-agent relationship. In contrast, a financial institution like a bank operates in a regulated market and 
its capital structure is highly geared whereby individual owners provide rarely subscribe to more than 10% of 
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capital while the rest is provided by depositors and bond holders. Hence, the agency problem is complex as 
besides owners and managers, there are three more layers of asymmetric information in banks, viz: (a) 
between depositors, the bank and the regulator, (b) between owners, managers and the regulator, and (c) 
between borrowers, managers and the regulator (Ciancanelli & Gonzalez, 2000). These additional layers of 
information asymmetry make a bank or an MFI very different the firm envisaged in the standard agency 
theory which views governance as mitigating tensions between owners and managers. The multiple 
stakeholders involved render agency theory inadequate so that a stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance could be more appropriate. 
 
Furthermore, Chakrabarty & Bass (2014) observe that the standard agency theory does not consider the role 
of the external environment in changing the ability of boards to direct and control firms. This becomes acute 




The theory postulates that managers in organizations serve diverse stakeholders such as suppliers, 
employees and business partners in addition to shareholders all with conflicting interests (Cyert & March, 
1963; Mintzberg, 1983; Freeman, 1984, 2010). Hung (1998) emphasizes the board’s role is therefore to 
coordinate and negotiate these interests.  
 
However, a proper management of the various interests implies an advanced understanding and 
identification of all the different stakeholders, as well as an understanding on how the various stakeholders 
interact and influence the organisation. An understanding of the stakeholder-organisation nexus leads to 
reciprocated benefits. Harrison, Freeman & Sá de Abreu (2015) observe that when stakeholders are 
accorded respect for their interests, they reciprocate positively for the benefit of the organization. Stakeholder 
theory suggests that managing stakeholders involves attending to the interests and well-being of these 
stakeholders, at a minimum (Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips, 2010). 
 
The application of stakeholder theory on MFIs is more complex relative to mainstream financial institutions 
which attend to fewer stakeholders. It therefore becomes very difficult to identify all the various stakeholders 
(Mori, 2010). However, for MFIs to effectively discharge their responsibilities, their key stakeholders should 
participate on boards where strategic decisions are made (Mori, 2010). Hartaska (2005) observed that MFIs 
with boards with a diversity of stakeholders performed better than those without diversity, which observation 
is also noted by Mori (2010).  
 
The common criticism for the stakeholder theory is how it intends to align stakeholders’ conflicting interests 
as it may not be practical to have boards that represent all stakeholders. Furthermore, Maher & Anderson 
(1999) observe that another problem is that agents (managers) may abuse “stakeholder” reasons to justify 
their inability to achieve performance targets. 
 
However, by embracing a stakeholder orientation, the stakeholder theory appears to be consistent with the 
economists’ broader definition of corporate governance. It is therefore increasingly becoming the preferred 
approach to corporate governance. Corporate governance of financial institutions, which are multi-
constituency firms, are amenable to a stakeholder approach. Himaj (2014) observes that this approach is 
particularly relevant for these institutions because of the diversity of their stakeholders. However, 
Chakrabarty & Bass (2014) observe that stakeholder theory does not explicitly consider that external 




Rooted in psychology and sociology, stewardship theory as proposed by Donaldson (1990) and Donaldson 
& Davis (1991) deals with situations whereby executives are stewards motivated to act in the best interests 
of their principals. It assumes that the interests of managers are aligned with the interests of shareholders.  
 
Stewards are collective, pro-organizational and have no self-interest motives other than to maximise the 
profit of the organisation. According to Rahman, Hussain, & Hossin (2019), these qualities of stewards do 
not mean they do not have personal needs. Sometimes a subjective view may lead to greater returns than 
an objective view so that working harder for the self-interest motive may result in better organizational 
   Makina / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 10 No 4, 2021 
  ISSN: 2147-4486 













performance. The steward understands the details of the organization and can take decisions which will grow 
personal interest while indirectly growing a collective interest.  
 
One implication of stakeholder theory is to view managers as trustworthy and reliable individuals (Nicholson 
& Kiel, 2007:588). Hence, power can be centralised in their hands to take advantage of their intimate 
knowledge of the business (Rebeiz, 2015). Donaldson & Davis(1991) propose that this would involve 
combining the positions of Chairman and CEO into one. The argument is that such a single leadership 
structure would produce superior performance. Torfing & Bentzen (2020: 4) further argues that the 
performance of the CEO is dependent on empowering which include, among other things, allowing the CEO 
to chair the board of directors. While agency theory focuses on control and conflict, the stewardship theory 
emphasizes co-operation and collaboration (Sundaramuthy & Lewis, 2003), and provides a non-economic 
basis for explaining relationships (Keay, 2017).  
 
Practically, stewardship theory may have relevance in organisations such as non-governmental 
organisations, church organisations and philanthropic organisations whose actors (including the managers) 
are driven by a shared homogeneous and humanistic goal. Since many MFIs have evolved from the 
generosity of non-governmental organizations, the stewardship theory can have relevance to those that 
would not yet commercialised. It may have little relevance in profit driven firms where there are always some 




Despite agency and stakeholder theories being the dominant theories in corporate governance, they do not 
recognize the institutional context in which firms operate. Selznick (1957) observes that the behaviour and 
outcomes of the firms are affected by factors that are not within its control such as “external norms, 
regulations, and social pressures”. As Hung (1998: 107) puts it: “organizations are constrained by social rules 
and follow taken-for-granted conventions that shape their form and practice” and the board’s role entails 
resolving these issues. Societies resolve corporate governance issues differently depending on constraints 
imposed by existing political and legal systems (Roe, 2003). La Porta et al. (1998) demonstrates that legal 
systems determine patterns of corporate finance and governance among countries.  
 
Thus, institutional theory recognizes the presence or absence and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
external institutions that should be considered in assessing the effectiveness of the board. Hall & Taylor 
(1996), among other researchers, observe that when effective institutions are in place, organizations are 
mainly concerned with gaining legitimacy. In contrast, where there are absent, organizations have to manage 
around identified institutional voids (Chakrabarty, 2009; Mair & Marti, 2006). 
 
Corporate Governance Practices in Microfinance Institutions 
 
The institutional setting of financial inclusion institutions is that they have a wider group of stakeholders 
compared to commercial banks. Financial inclusion institutions like MFIs operate like commercial banks in 
many respects though having distinct policies and procedures (Uchenna et al., 2020). This arises from the 
fact that they have social and economic objectives to provide financial services to underserved and 
vulnerable segments of the population, and at the same time ensuring their long-term sustainability. These 
differences affect corporate governance practices, that is, the mechanisms in which the interests of owners 
and other stakeholders are observed, and the manner the board of directors and managers exercise their 
functions. The “double bottom line” objective means that corporate governance should strike a balance 
between the two objectives of financial inclusion and sustainability. 
 
Financial inclusion institutions are diverse and given that there exist different organizational and ownership 
structures, they are bound to exhibit varying forms of corporate governance. However, this paper largely 
focuses on corporate governance of MFIs whose legal forms vary as they can exist as banks, non-bank 
financial institutions, credit unions, or NGOs. Each legal form would necessarily entail a unique corporate 
governance structure. It is also noteworthy that those MFIs that have not entirely commercialized have an 
additional relationship with donors in addition to relationships with clients, depositors, and regulators. There 
is information asymmetry between managers of MFIs and donors, and to mitigate this, donors would institute 
audit, rating, follow-up visits or employ on-site experts (Mersland, 2009). 
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MFIs are financially closer to a larger portion of the population than mainstream banking institutions (Bitok, 
2014).  As such, MFIs appear more complex since they must devise variable strategies to financially include 
many societal classes. The variable strategic nature of MFIs leads to information asymmetry between 
shareholders, managers, donors, and other stakeholders, and thus necessitatingimplementation of robust 
corporate governance structures (Uchenna et al., 2020).  
 
The IFC (2018) observes that as MFIs scale up and transform, they go three stages of governance as 
illustrated in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Three Evolving Stages of Corporate Governance in MFIs 
Stage 1: Founding Board Stage 2: Governing Board Stage 3: Institutional Board 
• Founder plays major 
role. 
• Board small with 
members from the local 
community, among 
others. 
• Founder also managing 
director chairs the 
board. 
• Financing needs 
increase as the MFI 
increases in size. 
• Skilled members are 
brought into the board. 
• Influence of the founder 
decreases. 
• Board meetings become 
more formal and 
assertive. 




• Board’s role to raise 
funds or to approve 
fundraising increases. 
• Board committees may 
become more formal to 
provide sufficient 
expertise, and to focus 
on the board’s oversight 
and monitoring function. 
Source: IFC (2018) 
 
What is evident from the evolutionary nature of corporate governance in MFIs is that it rudimentary during 
formation, transforming to a duality (combined CEO and Chairperson) at stage 2 and eventually to multi-
stakeholder structure during maturity level (stage 3). The maturity level of the corporate governance 
envisaged by the IFC (2018) appears to exhibit occupational diversity consistent with the empirical results 
by Hagendorff & Keasey (2012) who focused on a banking environment. Focusing on Kenya, Chenous, 
Mohamed, & Bitok (2014) found that MFI financial sustainability is influenced by board size, board 
composition, gender and duality. Nevertheless, studies specifically focusing on corporate governance of 
MFIs are still scant to make credible conclusions. 
 
Guidance on corporate governance of MFIs is provided by the Council of Microfinance Equity Funds (CMEF), 
which in 2005 published -“The Practice of Corporate Governance in Microfinance Institutions”- that was 
subsequently revised in 2012. This publication provides guidelines that recognize that MFIs have special 
characteristics that have a bearing on their corporate governance, and that it is necessary to go beyond 
generalizations and consider issues that boards actually face in practice. 
 
One central feature provided by the CMEF (2012) is how to deal with some unique governance issues of 
MFIs. All types of MFIs pursue both social and financial goals, and the challenge is staying focused on social 
goals. To strengthen oversight of social performance, the CMEF (2012: 10-11) recommends the following: 
 
1) “Commitment to social goals should be a requirement for board membership and should be taken into 
account during member vetting and orientation. 
2) A board may wish to form a social performance committee or assign individual board members to act 
as ‘champions’ for social performance, tasked with ensuring that mission fulfillment receives adequate 
weight and attention. 
3) Boards must invest time to develop a shared understanding about social goals and how to achieve 
them. 
4) Explicit social goals and targets should be set through the strategic planning process and approved by 
the board. 
5) MFIs should have, and the board should monitor (at each meeting), indicators demonstrating the 
achievement of social targets and goals. 
6) MFI boards should seek in-depth information from time to time, through market research, impact studies, 
and personal interaction with clients.” 
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Noteworthy, is the emphasis on achieving social goals and commitment to such goals being the main criterion 
in determining board membership. The IFC (2018) observes that MFIs are exposed to many different types 
of risks as they have to deal with many social classes. To underscore the emphasis on social goals there is 
accordingly a recommendation to create a social performance committee as one of the sub-committees of 
the board.In addition to CMEF (2012) guidelines, IFC (2018) recommends that to enhance governance and 
achieve sustainable growth of MFIs entails: “professionalizing boards, finding, and compensating qualified 
candidates, providing board training, and setting up the appropriate governance structures for the 
organization to manage the increased risks that come with growth”. Furthermore, governance and technology 
have been listed among the top ten risks faced by MFIs (IFC, 2018). Therefore, as MFIs embrace financial 
technology (fintech), their boards are faced with challenges to strategize and navigate opportunities and risks 
to provide responsible financial inclusion which responsibilities require new skills. Expertise in delivering 
digital financial services is enhanced through partnerships with fintech companies and having board 
members with the relevant skills. However, given the numerous risks involved in providing digital financial 
services which IFC (2018) outline as strategic risk, regulatory risk, operational risk, technology risk, 
partnership risk, among others, the relationships between fintech, financial inclusion and corporate 
governance remain are unexplored research avenues. 
 
In the literature, several failures in MFI governance have been reported. Marulanda et al. (2010) narrates 
several MFI failures in Latin America occasioned by poor governance. They observe that in the face of crisis, 
the main differentiating factor between those MFIs that overcome difficulties and those that do not is 
corporate governance structures. They identify the main weaknesses of corporate governance from failed 
experiences as stemming from concentration of power in a single person and weaknesses of boards. In 
contrast, Afi (2010) which investigated the link between corporate governance and access to finance of the 
World Savings Banking Institute members with a financial inclusion mandate found some interesting results. 
First, they found some evidence of a positive relationship between sound corporate governance and financial 
inclusion despite the limited data they examined. Second, they found that the components of corporate 
governance that contribute most to higher financial inclusion, which should be place, are the following: 
 
• The mission statement with a clear reference to the access to finance mandate; 
• Separation between CEO and Chairperson; 
• Existence of an external audit, an internal corporate governance code and/or a rating from an 
external agency; and  
• A proportion of women in the Board (gender diversity). 
 
Third, regarding country-level components, they found that the existence of quality credit registries with wider 
coverage facilitates more to financial inclusion. 
 
In another dimension Uchenna et al. (2020) investigated the impact of corporate governance on financial 
sustainability of MFIs in Nigeria and found no significant relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms (board independence, gender diversity) and financial sustainability. Another study by 
Ssekiziyivu et al. (2018) on how MFIs practice corporate governance in Uganda showed that while they have 
boards, they are not effective, and neither do they have fully constituted board committees. Similarly, a study 
by Widyatini (2019) that investigated the link between financial inclusion and corporate governance in 
Indonesia found that the implementation good corporate governance had a positive effect on credit supply, 
another dimension of financial inclusion akin to access to savings observed by Afi (2010). Furthermore, 
focusing on developing economies and MFIs operating at the BOP, Chakrabarty & Bass (2014) found that 
boards, which have more socio-economic expertise and female representation, are better placed to lower 
operating costs of MFIs. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
The paper provides an exploratory literature study on the link between corporate governance and financial 
inclusion. It has provided the institutional environment of microfinance institutions whose mandate is financial 
inclusion. It further gives a discussion of corporate governance theories as they apply to financial institutions 
including those with a mandate of financial inclusion. 
 
An important observation from the literature is that the institutional environment influences corporate 
governance structures. The empirical evidence albeit scant shows a positive relationship between sound 
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corporate governance and financial inclusion. However, it is acknowledged that corporate governance of 
financial inclusion institutions and their institutional environments have not been extensively researched. 
 
Being an exploratory literature review, the scope of the paper is limited and is only intended to stimulate 
future research on the subject matter. Envisaged future research would ordinarily be empirical studies 
examining the nexus between financial inclusion (distinguished by its various dimensions) and corporate 
governance as well as determinants of corporate governance in financial inclusion institutions such as MFIs 
and savings groups. 
 
Acknowledgement: An unbridged version of the paper was presented by the author at the 5th International 
Conference on Management Leadership and Governance held at the University of Witwatersrand, South 
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